Abstract In this paper we present two terminating tableau calculi for propositional Dummett logic obeying the subformula property. The ideas of our calculi rely on the linearly ordered Kripke semantics of Dummett logic. The first calculus works on two semantical levels: the present and the next possible world. The second calculus employs the semantical levels of known or not known at the present state of knowledge, that are usual in tableau systems, and exploits a property of the construction of the completeness theorem to introduce a check which is an alternative to loop check mechanisms.
Introduction
In this paper we present two terminating tableau calculi for propositional Dummett logic obeying the subformula property. The depth of the deductions of the first calculus Q is quadratic and allow to extract a counter model whose depth is n + 1 at most, with n the number of propositional variables in the formula to be decided. The depth of the deductions of the second calculus L is linear w.r.t the formula to be proved. To avoid the introduction of loop check mechanisms, our calculi exploit the linearly ordered Kripke semantics of Dummett logic. Calculus Q uses the ideas presented in paper [13] , and works on two states of knowledge: the present and the next possible world. Calculus L uses the semantical levels known and unknown at subformula of the conclusion. Moreover, the nodes of a proof with such a system are more cumbersome than the nodes of a tableau proof, because every node of the deduction expresses the relation order between the subformulas of the formula to be proved. Thus every node has a quadratic number of formula occurrences. In practice this is an hypersequent system that codify the whole model by means of disequalities between the subformulas of the formula to be proved. The system is also multiple premise, in the sense that an axiom is a chain of disequalities whose length is not fixed in advance, but depends on the formula to be proved. We also notice that the systems works by mixing up logical connectives and disequalities.
Paper [18] provides two goal-oriented calculi, one based on hypersequents and one on labelled sequents. We emphasize that the systems are restricted to the implicative fragment, whereas our results are given for the full language. Although a translation from the full language to the implicative fragment is possible, in the case of disjunction the cost is an exponential blow-up in the size of the formula. This implies that the depth of the deductions is exponential in the size of the formula to be proved, whereas the depth of every possible deduction obtained with Q and L is respectively quadratic and linear. There is also a significative difference in the proof systems: we achieve our results without using the more expressive power of hypersequents and labelled systems. In practice, hypersequents and labelled systems are two different ways to codify in the syntax the structure of a Kripke model: the former by using multiple components in every node of the proof, the latter by using an object language whose size is not fixed in advance but depends on the input. We again recall that the object language of the systems we provide is fixed, independent of the input and we use tableaux, thus the nodes of the proofs do not represent the snapshot of a whole counter model. In particular, calculus L is a tableau calculus only employing the usual semantics of known and unknown at the present state of knowledge.
As regards the techniques used in the paper, we have deliberately chosen to employ tableaux as proof-systems. Our choice is justified by the fact that the rules of our calculi can be clearly explained by semantical considerations based on Kripke models. For this reason we do not use the sequent systems, whose behaviour is upside-down with respect to a semantical characterization. However, since tableau and sequent calculi are related, it is an easy exercise to translate our calculi into sequents.
Kripke models for propositional Dummett logic are the semantical reference to prove the theorems of correctness and completeness. In particular, completeness is proved giving Henkin-style proofs. This technique is the key point to understand that the formulas contained in a single node of a tableau have enough information allowing us to devise a strategy to handle formulas of the kind T( A → B) by means of the usual rule concluding the sets of formulas {TB} and {F A, T( A → B)} without falling in an infinite loop. Since the required information is all contained in a single node of a tableau, there is no need to look backward as loop-checking mechanisms do. We consider this feature interesting also because it opens the possibility to get a similar result (with the appropriate modifications described in the conclusions) for propositional intuitionistic logic. To better explain these ideas we have organized the paper first giving Q, then the intermediate calculus I, exploiting some properties of the construction of the completeness theorem of Q, and finally L, the tableau calculus obtained by a deeper analysis of the construction of the completeness theorem of Q.
Basic Definitions
We consider the propositional language based on a denumerable set of propositional variables PV, the boolean constant ⊥ and the logical connectives ∧, ∨, →. We call atoms the elements of PV ∪ {⊥}. In the following, formulas (respectively set of formulas and propositional variables) are denoted by letters A, B, C. . . (respectively S, T, U,. . . and p, q, r,. . . ) possibly with subscripts or superscripts.
From the introduction we recall that Dummett Logic (Dum) can be axiomatized by adding to any axiom system for propositional intuitionistic logic the axiom scheme ( p → q) ∨ (q → p) and a well-known semantical characterization of Dum is by linearly ordered Kripke models. In the paper model means a linearly ordered Kripke model, namely a structure K = P,≤,ρ, , where P, ≤, ρ is a linearly ordered set with ρ minimum with respect to ≤ and is the forcing relation, a binary relation on P × (PV ∪ {⊥}) such that: (i) if α p and α ≤ β, then β p; (ii) for every α ∈ P, α ⊥ does not hold. Hereafter we denote the members of P by means of lowercase letters of the Greek alphabet.
The forcing relation is extended in a standard way to arbitrary formulas of our language as follows:
1. α A ∧ B iff α A and α B; 2. α A ∨ B iff α A or α B; 3. α A → B iff, for every β ∈ P such that α ≤ β, β A implies β B;
We write α A when α A does not hold. It is easy to prove that for every formula A the persistence property holds: If α A and α ≤ β, then β A. We say that β is immediate successor of α iff α < β and there is no γ ∈ P such that α < γ < β. A formula A is valid in a model K = P,≤,ρ, if and only if ρ A. It is well-known that Dum coincides with the set of formulas valid in all models [6] . Before going into technical details we give an informal description of the whole machinery. The calculus Q works on signed formulas, that is well-formed formulas prefixed with one of the signs T (with TA to be read "the fact A is known at the present state of knowledge"), F (with F A to be read "the fact A is not known at the present state of knowledge"), F l (with F l A to be read "this is the last state of knowledge where A is not known"), F n (with F n A to be read "there exists a future state of knowledge where A is not known"), T n (with T n A to be read " A will be known in the next state of knowledge"), T (with T A to be read as "TA holds and if A is of the kind B → C, then FB holds") and T (with T A to be read as "TA holds and if A is of the kind B → C, then F n B holds") and on sets of signed formulas (hereafter we omit the word "signed" in front of "formula" in all the contexts where no confusion arises). By inspecting the rules of the calculus we have that signs T and T are used for implicative formulas only. Also note that although F l A means FA and T n A, for the rules of the calculus it is essential to keep this sign, otherwise in F-decide we would have the premise copied in the left conclusion, giving rise to a calculus with the usual infinite loop problems. The calculus Q does not contain explicit rules to handle T n -signed formulas. The sign T n aims to mark formulas that will be signed with T after an application of F n T. Thus, rule F n T handles T n -signed formulas, changing their sign to T. Rule F-decide handles F-formulas. In semantical terms of counter model construction, given the formula FA, rule F-decide decides if in the next state of knowledge the formula A will be a known or an unknown fact. Similarly, rule T-decide decides the semantical status of the antecedent A for formulas of the kind T( A → B). By the rules of the calculus, if T( A → B) becomes T( A → B), then in the subsequent sets the sign of A → B can only be T or T and rules T-decide and F n T are the only rules where the sign can be switched. Rule F n T is the only non-invertible rule of Q, thus to devise a complete strategy that does not require backtracking it is sufficient that rule F n T is applied when no other rule is applicable. Finally, the following features of Q allow us to prove the termination: every node of the tableau contains at least a F l -formula and an application of F n T increases the number of T-signed formulas. Also note that, if F n T is applied only when no other rule is applicable, which is the way we want to use F n T, then the set S in the premise of F n T contains signed atomic formulas only and at least an F l -atomic formula. This implies that S c in the conclusion contains at least one new T-signed atomic formula. Summarizing, in spite of the rightmost set in the conclusion of rules T →, F-decide and T-decide, any sequence of application of rules ends in a set containing signed atomic formulas only and we do not have infinite loops. Now we come to technical details. The semantics of formulas extends to signed formulas as follows. Let K = P,≤,ρ, be a model, let α ∈ P, let H be a signed formula and let S be a set of signed formulas. We say that α realizes H (respectively α realizes S and K realizes S), and we write α H (respectively α S and K S), iff the following conditions hold: From the meaning of the signs we get the conditions that make a set S of formulas impossible to be realized by any world of any model: S is inconsistent if one of the following conditions holds:
When S fails to meet these conditions we say that S is consistent.
It is easy to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If a set of formulas S is inconsistent, then for every Kripke model K = P,≤,ρ, and for every α ∈ P, α S.
In the rules of the calculus we distinguish the premise, the set of formulas above the line and the conclusion(s), the set(s) of formulas below the line, separated by a vertical line in case the consequences are more than one. The premise main formulas are the formulas that are in evidence in the premise, the other formulas are the premise minor formulas. In each consequence, the formulas in evidence are the consequence main formulas (we will omit the words premise and consequence where no confusion arises). We say that a rule applies to a set of formulas U, if the premise of the rule can be instantiated with U. The premise main formulas of a rule have the role of synctactical constraint: it is necessary that U contains formulas of the appropriate kind to instantiate the premise main formulas of the rule. Given a non-atomic signed formula H, we denote with Rule(H) the name of the rule related to H, that is the rule with a premise main formula that can be instantiated with H. In this case we also say that Rule(H) applies to H and more in general, we say that a rule R applies to a formula H ∈ U (respectively the set {H 1 , . . . , H n } ⊆ U) to mean that it is possible to instantiate the premise of R taking S as U \ {H} (respectively U \ {H 1 , . . . , H n }). As an example, given the set U = {T(B ∧ C), T( A ∧ C), F( A ∨ B)}, by applying the rule T∧ taking T( A ∧ C) as premise main formula means to instantiate the premise of T∧ taking S = {T(B ∧ C), F( A ∨ B)} and H = T( A ∧ C). We implicitly always consider duplication-free instantiations, that is after the instantiation of the premise of a rule, the premise main formulas do not occur in S (that is, it do not occur as premise minor formula).
A tableau for a set of formulas S is a tree obtained from the root S by subsequently instantiating the premise of a rule with consistent leaves. When all the leaves of a tableau are inconsistent, we say that the tableau is closed, the tableau is a proof for S and S is provable. To prove a formula A we use the rules of the calculus starting from {F l A}.
Example 1
We apply the rules of the calculus to prove that the de-Brujin formula
where H = p ∧ q ∧ r and A ≡ B means ( A → B) ∧ (B → A), is provable in Dummett logic. We start with {F l (dB)} and by F l → and T∧ we get
By applying T → to S taking T(( p ≡ q) → H) as premise main formula we get the sets
We leave S 2 and continue the description on S 3 . By applying T → to S 3 taking T((q ≡ r) → H) as main formula premise, we get
We continue the example only considering S 6 . By applying T → to S 6 taking T((r ≡ p) → H) as premise main formula, we get
We leave S 8 and we consider S 9 that we use to instantiate the premise of rule F n T. We get three sets:
Now to conclude that S 9 is provable it is sufficient to consider TH and the F l -formula in S 10 , S 11 and S 12 and we get they are provable. The construction is analogous for S 2 , S 5 and S 8 which are provable. In Fig. 3 is given the structure of the tableau with the indication of the position of the premise main formulas.
Remark 1
The presentation of the calculus is without efficiency in mind. We could exploit the meaning of signs F l and T n to introduce more rules and checks that allow us to reduce the size of the proofs. As an example we could extend the notion of inconsistent set by adding to those given above the following conditions:
This would avoid to perform useless deduction steps all ending in inconsistent sets. The rule F n T − opt given in Fig. 4 is an optimization of rule F n T of Fig. 2 . Since in the consequences of F n T-opt some formulas occur signed with T or F n (see the definition of V j ), the result is that F n T-opt avoids useless applications of F-decide and T-decide, which are the rules that introduce branching points.
Fig. 3 Proof of ((
Remark 2 Calculus Q can be translated into a sequent calculus along the following lines:
-the structure of a sequent is Tn ; T ; T ; T ⇒ F ; Fn ; F l that is it has four compartments in the left-hand side, corresponding to the signs T, T n , T and T and three compartments in the right-hand side, corresponding to the signs F, F l and F n . 
From the proposition above we get
Theorem 1 If there exists a closed tableau for A, then A is valid in Dummett logic.
Remark 3 Rule F l ∧ can be given also in this version:
However, this is a weaker form of our rule, since it states that A will be forced in the next possible world, whereas our rule states that A is forced now. Note that the following is not correct
because from the fact that now A ∧ B is not known and it will be known at the next possible world does not follow that one between A and B is known, since we could have that F l A and F l B hold. Thus another possibility is to handle F l ∧-formulas by means of the rule
Decision Procedure Using Calculus Q
We describe a procedure using the rules of the calculus to return a proof or a counter model for a given set of signed formulas S.
In the following we sketch the recursive procedure D(S). Given a set S of formulas, D(S) returns either a closed tableau for S or NULL (if there exists a model realizing S). To describe D we use the following definitions and notations. We call α-rules and β-rules the rules of Fig. 1 with one consequence and with two consequences, respectively. The α-formulas and β-formulas are the kind of the signed formulas in evidence in the premise of the α-rules and β-rules, respectively (e.g.
T( A ∧ B) is an α-formula and T( A ∨ B) is a β-formula).
Let S be a set of formulas, let H ∈ S be an α or β-formula. Rule(H) denote the closed tableau for S defined in the obvious way. Moreover, R i (H) (i = 1, 2, 3) denotes the set of the consequence main formulas related to Rule(H). For instance:
In the case of F n T we generalize the above notation. Let S Fn T be the set of all the F n -formulas of S. Let S 1 | . . . |S n be the nodes of the tableau obtained by applying to S the rule F n T. If Tab 1 . . . , Tab n are closed tableaux for S 1 , . . . , S n , respectively, then
Fn T is the closed tableau for S. With R i (S Fn T ) we denote the set of formulas that replaces the set S Fn T in the i-th consequence of F n T. For example, given
4. If the rule F n T applies to S, then let S Fn T = {S A ∈ S|S ∈ { T, F n }} and n = |S Fn T |. We emphasize that function D respects a particular sequence in the application of the rules: F n T is applied if no other rule is applicable. As a result no backtracking step is necessary. Moreover, to decide A, the function call D({F l A}) is performed.
If there exists
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that π i = D((S \ S Fn T ) c ∪ R i (S Fn T )) is NULL, then D returns NULL. Otherwise π 1 , . . . ,
Termination and Complexity of Function D
By the rules handling F l -formulas, we have that when rule F n T is applied, the formal parameter S contains at least an F l -atomic formula and by rule F n T, every actual parameter of the recursive call performed in Step 4 contains a F l -formula and a T-atomic formula not occurring in S. This implies that every application of F n T introduces a new T-atomic formula and thus we can have at most n applications of rule F n T, where n is the number of propositional variables in A. The number of applications of rules between two applications of rule F n T is also finite because: (i) the consequence main formulas of rules T∧, T∨, F l ∧, F l ∨, F l →, the consequence main formulas of the two leftmost consequences of rule T → and the consequence main formulas of rule T-decide contain less connectives than the premise main formula; (ii) in the rightmost consequence of T → and T-decide, the main formula contains the same number of connectives of the premise main formula, but between two applications of F n T they are not handled by any rule; (iii) the consequence main formula F l A and F n A of F-decide contains the same connectives of the premise main formula F A. If A is not atomic, by application of F l -rules, formulas with less connectives of F A are obtained; in the other cases, between two applications of F n T such consequence main formulas are not handled. These remarks imply that the function call D({F l A}) always terminates. More formally, we can define a binary relation ≺ A on sets of formulas containing only subformulas of the formula A to be decided, defined as follows: S ≺ A S iff (i) the set of T-atomic formulas in S includes the set of atomic formulas in S, or (ii) the set of T-atomic formulas in S coincides with the set of atomic formulas in S and the number of connectives in S is lower than in S or (iii) the sets S and S contain the same T-atomic formulas, the same number of connectives and they differ for the sign of a single formula B such that TB ∈ S and TB ∈ S or TB ∈ S and TB ∈ S or FB ∈ S and F l B ∈ S or FB ∈ S and F n B ∈ S . By inspecting the rules of the calculus it follows that every recursive call is performed on an actual parameter S such that S ≺ A S. By definition of ≺ A and the fact that the sets only contain subformulas of the formula to be decided, every chain of recursive calls on consistent sets ends in a set only containing signed atomic formulas. This implies that function D terminates. From this analysis it is easy also to get that the number of nested recursive calls is quadratic in the size of the formula to be proved: we have already established that the number of calls at
Step 4, corresponding to an application of F n T, is linear in the size of the formula to be proved. Now we establish the number of recursive calls in the other steps of Function D. This corresponds to evaluate the number of applications of rules in Fig. 1 . The analysis is a refinement of (i)-(iii) given above: the number of occurrences of connectives in the consequences of the rules T∧, T∨, T →, T-decide, F l ∧, F l ∨ and F l → is less than in the premise or the number of occurrences of connectives is the same, but the premise main formula is turned into T-formula, a kind of formula which is not handled by rules in Fig. 1 . As regards rule F-decide, premise and consequences have the same number of connectives, but the premise main formula is turned into an F n -formula or an F l -formula. In Fig. 1 there is no rule for F n -formulas and in the consequences of F l -rules the number of occurrences of connectives is lower than in the premise. Summarizing, we have proved that between two subsequent nested recursive calls at Step 4, the number of subsequent nested recursive calls performed at Steps 2 and 3 is bounded by the double of the number of connectives occurring in the formula to be proved. Thus we have proved:
Theorem 2 The number of nested recursive calls of Function D is at most quadratic in the size of the formula to be decided. This is also the bound on the depth of every possible tableau built with rules of Q.
Completeness of Function D
In order to get the completeness of D, in the following it is proved that given a set of formulas S, if the call of D(S) returns NULL, then there is enough information to build a model K = P,≤,ρ, such that ρ S.
Theorem 3 (Completeness of D) Let A be a formula. If A is valid in propositional Dummett logic, then D({F l A}) returns a proof.
Proof To prove the theorem, we consider a set S of formulas and we prove that if D(S) returns NULL, then there exists a Kripke model K = P,≤,ρ, such that ρ S. We get the statement of the theorem by setting S = {F l A} and using the contrapositive.
We proceed by induction on the number of nested recursive calls. It is worth noting that the construction of K uses the sets of formulas involved in Step 4 or 5 of function D as elements of P.
Basis There are no recursive calls. Then Step 5 has been performed. We notice that S is consistent (otherwise Step 1 would have been performed). Indeed, S only contains atomic formulas signed with T, T n , F l . It is easy to prove that the model K = P,≤,ρ, , where ρ = S, P = {ρ}, ρ ≤ ρ and ρ p iff T p ∈ S, realizes S.
Step By induction hypothesis we assume that the proposition holds for all sets S such that D(S ) requires less than n recursive calls. To prove the proposition holds for a set S such that D(S) requires n recursive calls, all the possible cases where the procedure returns the NULL value have to be considered. The only interesting case is related to the application of rule F n T.
NULL value returned performing Step 4 By induction hypothesis there exists a model
A and for every FC ∈ R j (S Fn T ), ρ C. We build the following structure K = P, ≤, ρ, such that
where we set ρ = S. Since K is a Dummett model realizing (S \ S Fn T ) c , it follows that K is a Dummett model. As a matter of fact, ρ is the immediate successor of ρ and T A ∈ S implies TA ∈ (S \ S Fn T ) c , thus the forcing relation is preserved. This also implies that: ρ A j holds, that, together with the facts ρ
, ρ A holds, that together with the facts ρ A → B and ρ A, implies that ρ T( A → B); for every FC ∈ R j (S Fn T ), ρ C holds, that together with the fact ρ C implies ρ F n C. Thus we have proved that ρ S Fn T . As regard the other formulas in S: if F l A ∈ S, then A is an atomic formula and T A ∈ (S \ S Fn T ) c . Since S is consistent (otherwise Step 1 would have been performed) T A ∈ S holds, this implies ρ A; if T n A ∈ S holds, then T A ∈ (S \ S Fn T ) c and hence ρ A. Summarizing we conclude that ρ S.
We remark that following the construction of Theorem 3, it is straightforward how to modify function D to get a function returning a proof or a counter model. In particular, the proof puts in evidence that a counter model can be extracted by any branch of a tableau proof ending in a consistent set to which no further rule is applicable. By the fact that every application of F n T introduces in the consequences a new T-signed propositional variable, it follows that if a formula A is realizable, then D returns a counter model for A having n + 1 elements at most, where n is the number of propositional variables of A. Finally, note that the elements of the counter model K are sets of formulas only with the aim to simply the discussion in next section.
The Two-Signs Tableau Calculus L
Now we start to discuss a calculus handling formulas signed with T and F only. We present our ideas in two steps. First we introduce calculus I having rules to handle the main connective of F-formulas, this allows us to remove the rule T-decide. Then we go a step further to get our final calculus L.
Handling F-Formulas
To handle F-formulas by rules based on the main connective, it is necessary to introduce a machinery to determine, given T( A → B), if A is forced. Such a machinery is based on the definition of the binary relation |= between sets of signed formulas and formulas, that is similar to the boolean satisfiability of a formula in a model:
Definition 1 (Relation |= for the object language of Q) Let S be a consistent set of signed formulas and let A be a formula. We write S |= A iff We are interested to check if S |= A holds when F n T is the only rule applicable to S. The relation |= aims to express via syntax the semantical notion of realizability. In other words, we are looking for a syntactical checking for forcing and non-forcing of a formula in a world of the Kripke model built in the proof of Theorem 3. Relation |= allows us to express such a checking via the way the formulas are handled in the construction of the counter model. The construction has the properties suggesting that a new calculus managing T and F-formulas and a syntactical checking based on |= can be given. We start to show a relation between and |= in the construction given in Theorem 3: Basis A is an atomic formula. We have the cases for S ∈ {T, F l , F n , F}.
Case S = T By construction of K, for every β ∈ P such that α ≤ β, T A ∈ β holds and thus β |= A holds by definition of |=.
Case S = F l By construction F l A ∈ α and T A ∈ α. By definition of |= we get α |= A.
Case S = F n By construction F n A ∈ α. By definition of |= we get α |= A.
Case S = F By construction F l A ∈ α or F n A ∈ α and we immediately get that α |= A.
Step we proceed by structural induction on A.
Case T A = T(B → C) The hypothesis α S implies that for every β ∈ P such that α ≤ β, F n A ∈ β holds. By construction of proof in Theorem 3 we have three cases: (i) there exists a subsequent set S of S such that TC ∈ S and α S . By induction hypothesis we get the assertion; (ii) there exists a subsequent set S such that F l B, T n C ∈ S and α S . By induction hypothesis we get α |= B. Moreover, by the construction we have that there exists a set S such that TC ∈ S and β S , with β ∈ P such that β is immediate successor of α. By induction hypothesis, we have that for every γ ∈ P such that β ≤ γ , γ |= C. By definition of |= we get α |= B → C; (iii) there exists a subsequent set S of S such that T( A → B) ∈ S . By construction this implies that T( A → B) ∈ α and there exist set S and a world β ∈ P such that β S and F l B, T n C ∈ S . Following previous point we get that for every γ ∈ P such that β ≤ γ , γ |= B → C holds. By construction of K, for every γ ∈ P such that α ≤ γ < β, T(B → C) ∈ γ , thus by definition of |=, we get γ |= B → C. Summarizing we have proved that for every β ∈ P such that α ≤ β, β |= B → C.
Case T A = T(B → C) This is Point (iii) of Case T A = T(B → C).
Case T A = T(B → C) By construction we have two cases: (i) there exists a subsequent set S of S such F l B, T n C ∈ S and α S . This is Point (ii) of Case TA = T(B → C); (ii) there exists a subsequent set S of S such that T(B → C) ∈ S and α S . This is Point (iii) of Case TA = T(B → C).
Case Case FA By construction of the proof in Theorem 3 we have two cases: (i) there exists a subsequent set S of S such that F l A ∈ S and α S . In the above cases we have already proved that α |= B → C holds; (ii) there exists a subsequent set S such that F n A ∈ S , thus F n A ∈ α. By definition of |= we get α |= A.
Next Proposition 3 is the main step to introduce our new calculus. We express the relationship between and |= in the construction of the counter model given in Theorem 3. What we are going to prove is that if in the construction of the counter model K the formula F l A is occurred and there exists α ∈ P such that α A, then the syntactical information in α allows us to prove α A via α |= A, also when T A ∈ α. We emphasize the similarity with the proof in the Henkin style of Theorem 3, where we are able to prove that α A holds even if TA does not belong to α. To help the intuition, we can say that relation |= brings into the formal system a feature of the Henkin style proofs that usually is used only to prove properties of the proof systems at hand. The lesson that in our opinion can be drawn is that in the nodes of the proofs there is information that can be useful to reduce the search space but it is not used.
Proposition 3
Let S be a set and let us suppose that F l A ∈ S, the call D(S) returns NULL and in the counter model K = P, ≤, ρ, built in Theorem 3 there exists an element of P forcing A. Let α ∈ P be the minimum world such that α A. We have that α |= A and for every β ∈ P such that β < α, β |= A.
Proof By the construction given in Theorem 3, the hypothesis F l A ∈ S implies ρ A. Moreover, by the meaning of the sign F l we have that α is the immediate successor of ρ. We proceed by induction on A.
Basis A is a propositional variable. We have that α A iff (by definition of ) T A ∈ α iff (by definition of |=) α |= A. By hypothesis, for every β < α, β A holds, thus by construction of K, T A ∈ β holds and, by definition of |=, β |= A holds.
Step Case A = B → C In the stack of the recursive calls of D(S) there exists a subsequent set S of S such that TB ∈ S and F l C ∈ S . By the completeness theorem we have ρ S , thus ρ B and ρ C. Since α B → C, by the construction given in Theorem 3, F n (B → C) ∈ α holds and from ρ B, α C holds. By induction hypothesis on C, α |= C. Thus we conclude that α |= B → C. Since TB ∈ S , F l C ∈ S and ρ S , by Lemma 1 we get that ρ |= B → C holds.
Case A = B ∧ C We have three cases: (i) in the stack of the recursive calls there exists a subsequent set S of S such that F l B, F l C ∈ S . By Theorem 3, ρ F l B, F l C, thus ρ B and ρ C. Since α A ∧ B we have α A and α B. By induction hypothesis applied to B and C we get α |= B and α |= C, thus α |= B ∧ C, ρ |= B and ρ |= C, thus ρ |= B ∧ C; (ii) F l B, TC ∈ S . By Theorem 3, ρ F l B, TC. Since α B ∧ C, we have α B and α C. By induction hypothesis and Lemma 1, α |= B ∧ C. Moreover, since ρ S and F l B ∈ S we get ρ |= B and ρ |= B ∧ C hold. (iii) TB, F l C ∈ S. The case is similar to the previous one.
Case A = B ∨ C We have two cases: (i) FC, F l B ∈ S . By completeness theorem ρ S and α B, thus by induction hypothesis applied to B, α |= B and ρ |= B. This implies α |= B ∨ C. Now, since FC ∈ S we have that there exists a set S subsequent to S such that ρ S and F l C ∈ S or F n C ∈ S . In both cases we get ρ |= C and thus ρ |= B ∨ C. (ii) FB, F l C ∈ S . The case is similar to the previous one.
Note that in the proof above, we take advantage from the fact that the world α is the immediate successor of ρ, thus the world β in the statement of the proposition in this case coincides with ρ, thus we could get that β |= A also by using Lemma 1. The difficult part will come when, by construction, we cannot say that the world α is the immediate successor of ρ. We will face this problem with our final calculus L. The strategy employed by function D implies that a F-formula sooner or later become a F l -formula. We can use the result above to get calculus I, which represents a first slight change to the calculus Q:
-We leave out the signs T and T and the rule T-decide.
-the new calculus I has the rules T∧, T∨, F l ∧, F l ∨, F l → and F-decide of Q. Rule F n T now becomes a rule handling F n -formulas only, thus we refer to it with the name of F n . Finally, I has the rules in Fig. 5 ; -relation |= needs to be redefined according to the syntax of the new calculus: Definition 2 (Relation |= for the object language of I) Let S be a consistent set of signed formulas and let A be a formula. We write S |= A iff F n A ∈ S and one of the following conditions hold:
(i) A is a propositional variable and T A ∈ S; (ii) A = B ∧ C, S |= B and S |= C; (iii) A = B ∨ C and S |= B or S |= C; (iv) A = B → C and S |= B or S |= C or T A ∈ S;
-the sign T is introduced to label formulas of the kind A → B that we do not want being used as premise main formula of T →. Thus, given a formula A, the meaning of T A coincides with the meaning of T A.
By the propositions given above, if S |= A holds, then meaning of T( A → B) is exactly the same of T( A → B).
By using previous results it is not difficult design a decision procedure based on I and to prove correctness and completeness. In such a procedure rule T is possibly applied if no other rule but F n is applicable. Now we can do another step and remove sign F l and rule F-decide. The propositions given above use the fact that the information about an F-formula is not syntactically lost. As a matter of fact, every F-formula is handled by F-decide and sooner or later a F-formula is turned into a F l -formula and in the meantime the Fformula has become a F n -formula.
The rules of this new calculus L are given in Fig. 6 . The calculus works on the signs T and F. The sign T labels formulas that will not be used as premise main formula of T → 1 . Thus T is not part of the object language, but aims to bring in the logical apparatus the strategy to always get finite tableaux. The signs F l , T n and 6 The calculus L F l are no longer necessary to get a calculus obeying the subformula property. A set S is inconsistent iff T⊥ ∈ S, {T A, F A} ⊆ S or {T A, FA} ⊆ S . Note rule F∧ where both A and B occur. This is necessary to get for L the analogue of Proposition 3. For this calculus relation |= is defined as follows: Definition 3 (Relation |= for the object language of L) Let S be a consistent set of formulas built of the object language of L and let A be a formula. We write S |= A iff F A ∈ S and one of the following conditions hold:
(i) T A ∈ S; (ii) T A ∈ S; (iii) A = B ∧ C, S |= B and S |= C; (iv) A = B ∨ C and S |= B or S |= C; (v) A = B → C and S |= B or S |= C.
As for the rules of the calculus, T is the only rule requiring a proof of correctness. Moreover, for every rule of L but F →, it is immediate to check that if an element α ∈ P of a model K = P,≤,ρ, realizes one of the sets in the conclusion, then α also realizes the premise.
Example 2 We use the rules of the calculus L to show the provability in Dummett logic of the de-Brujin formula
We start with {F(dB)} and by F → and T∧ we get:
By instantiating the premise of T → 1 with S taking T(( p ≡ q) → H) as premise main formula we get S 1 = {TH, T((q ≡ r) → H), T((r ≡ p) → H), FH}, which is closed, and S 2 = {F( p ≡ q), T(( p ≡ q) → H), T((q ≡ r) → H), T((r ≡ p) → H), FH}. Now we instantiate the premise of T → 1 with S 2 taking T((q ≡ r) → H) as premise main formula. We get S 3 = {F( p ≡ q), T(( p ≡ q) → H), TH, T((r ≡ p) → H), FH}, which is closed, and S 4 = {F( p ≡ q), T(( p ≡ q) → H), F(q ≡ r), T((q ≡ r) → H), T((r ≡ p) → H), FH}. By a further application of T → 1 to S 4 we get S 5 = {F( p ≡ q), T(( p ≡ q) → H), F(q ≡ r), T((q ≡ r) → H), TH, FH}, which is closed, and
Now the proof proceeds symmetrically: formulas F( p ≡ q), F(q ≡ r), F(r ≡ p) are used as premise main formula of F∧ and we get eight sets of formulas. We only consider one of them:
We instantiate the premise of F → with S 7 and we get the sets:
By applying F → to S 8 we get
Set S 12 is inconsistent. By the fact that T p, Tq ∈ S 11 follows that S 11 |= p and S 11 |= q.
This implies that S 11 |= p ≡ q holds and rule T is applicable taking T(( p ≡ q) → H) as premise main formula. The consequence is set S 13 = {T p, TH, Tq, Fr, T((q ≡ r) → H), F(r → p), T((r ≡ p) → H)}.
Since H = p ∧ q ∧ r, by using TH as premise main formula we get an inconsistent set. In all other cases the proof goes similarly (Fig. 7) .
It is worth noticing that S 7 |= p0 ≡ p1, because, since F( p0 → p1) ∈ S 7 , by definition of |=, S 7 |= p0 → p1. This emphasizes that in order to get a correct application of rule T, in the definition of S |= B → C the condition F(B → C) ∈ S is necessary. A variant of the definition of |= is to require F A ∈ S for every kind of A.
Decision Procedure Using Calculus L
The following Function G uses calculus L to decide a set S. We recall that the formulas in S can be written only using T and F, since T is a private labelling of the deduction and as far as concerns the deduction T-formulas are T formulas are not used as premise main formula of rule T →.
Function G(S)
1. If S is an inconsistent set, then G returns the proof S; 2. If an α-rule applies to S, then let H be a α-formula of S. If G((S \ {H}) ∪ R 1 (H)) returns a proof π, then G returns the proof
S π
Rule(H), otherwise G returns NULL; 3. If a β-rule applies to S, then let H be a β-formula of S.
Rule(H);
Fig. 7 Proof of ((
p ≡ q) → H) ∧ ((q ≡ r) → H) ∧ ((r ≡ p) → H) → H 4. If rule F∧ applies to S, then let H = F( A ∧ B) be a formula in S. Let π 1 = G((S \ {H}) ∪ {FA, FB}), π 2 = G((S \ {H}) ∪ {FA, TB}) and π 3 = G((S \ {H}) ∪ {T A, FB}). If π 1 , π 2 or π 3 is NULL, then G returns NULL, otherwise G returns S π1|π2|π3 F∧;
If T( A → B) ∈ S and S |=
6. If the rule F → applies to S, then let S F→ = {F( A → B) ∈ S} and n = |S F→ |. 7. If none of the previous points apply, then G returns NULL.
If there exists
end function .
Note that if Function G returns NULL, the elements of the Kripke model built in the proof of the completeness theorem are the sets of formulas involved in Steps 6 and 7.
Termination and Complexity of Function G
Given a signed formula A in the object language of L, we define the complexity C( A) as follows: if the sign of A is T or F, then C( A) is the number of connectives of A; if the sign of A is T, then A = T(B → C) and C( A) is the number of connectives of C plus one. The complexity of a set S is the sum of the complexities of the formulas occurring in it and, with a bit of overloading we denote it with C(S) too. We define the binary relation ≺ on sets of formulas as follows: S ≺ S iff C(S ) < C(S) or C(S ) = C(S) and there exists a formula A → B such that T( A → B) ∈ S and T( A → B) ∈ S. By inspection the rules of the calculus every recursive call is performed on an actual parameter S such that S ≺ S. By definition of ≺ it follows that every chain of recursive calls of G ends in a set S only containing atomic formulas and (possibly) formulas of the kind T ( A → B) where S |= A. By an inspection of the rules of L, we get that along a branch of a deduction, formulas of the kind A → B with sign T are handled at most twice: by rule T → and then by rule T. All the other kinds of formulas are handled at most once. Thus we have proved:
Theorem 4 The depth of every possible tableau built with the rules of L is 2n, with n number of connectives occurring in the root of the tableau.
Now we evaluate the computational cost of deciding in Step 5 if S |= A holds. Function G performs this check when no other rule but F → and T → is applicable. The number of times that the check is performed, that is the number of times that
Step 5 is reached coincides with the number of implicative connectives in the formula to be decided. By definition of |= we have that the computational cost of deciding S |= A is linear w.r.t. the size of A. Thus every time Step 5 is reached, the computational cost to decide if T → is applicable is linear in the size of the formula to be proved. Summarizing we have proved:
Theorem 5 Along every branch of every possible tableau built with the rules of L, the computational cost of deciding S |= A in Step 5 of Function G is quadratic in the size of the root of the tableau.
We conclude that to decide a formula A, the computational time to build every branch is bounded by the square of the size of A and its length is linearly bounded by the size of A.
Correctness and Completeness of Function G
To prove correctness and completeness, we need to prove that the properties of |= still hold in the construction of G. Following the lines of Lemma 1, we can prove that relation |= is persistent: Lemma 2 (Occurrence implies persistence of |=) Let us suppose that S A ∈ S, with S ∈ {T, T} and every subsequent set S in the stack of the nested recursive calls generated by G(S) is consistent. Then S |= A holds.
Proof First we notice that by the rules of L, the case T A ∈ S holds only for A of the kind B → C. We proceed by induction on A.
Basis A is an atomic formula. T A ∈ S holds, implies, by construction, that for every subsequent set S in the stack of the nested recursive calls T A ∈ S holds. Since by hypothesis S is consistent, FA ∈ S holds and by thus definition of |= we get the assertion.
Step Case A = B ∧ C We have different cases: (i) TA ∈ S . By hypothesis S is consistent, thus FA ∈ S and by definition of |= we get the assertion; (ii) T A ∈ S . By construction, in the stack of the nested recursive calls there are two sets U and V, previous of S , such that T(B ∧ C) ∈ U and TB, TC ∈ V. Since by hypothesis V is consistent, FB, FC ∈ V. For every set S in the stack of the nested recursive calls occurring between S and U, T A ∈ S holds, thus S |= A holds. Moreover, by induction hypothesis, for every subsequent set S of V, S |= A and S |= B hold. This implies, by definition of |=, that S |= B ∧ C holds. Summarizing, we have proved that for every subsequent set S of S, S |= A ∧ B holds.
Case A = B ∨ C We have different cases: (i) TA ∈ S . By hypothesis S is consistent, thus FA ∈ S and by definition of |= we get the assertion; (ii) T A ∈ S . By construction, in the stack of the nested recursive calls there are two sets U and V, previous of S , such that T(B ∨ C) ∈ U and TB ∈ V, thus FB ∈ V, or TC ∈ V, thus FC ∈ V. For every set S in the stack of the nested recursive calls occurring between S and U, T A ∈ S holds, thus S |= A holds. Moreover, by induction hypothesis, for every subsequent set S of V we have S |= A or S |= B holds and this implies, by definition of |=, S |= B ∨ C holds. Summarizing, we have proved that for every subsequent set S of S, S |= A ∧ B holds.
Case A = B → C We have T A ∈ S or TA ∈ S. Let us consider T A ∈ S. There are two cases: (i) TA ∈ S holds. By hypothesis S is consistent, thus FA ∈ S . By definition of |= we immediately get S |= A; (ii) T A ∈ S holds. By construction, in the stack of the nested recursive calls there are two sets U and V, previous of S , such that T(B → C) ∈ U and TC ∈ V. Since V is consistent, FC ∈ V holds. For every set S in the stack of the nested recursive calls occurring between S and U, T A ∈ S holds, thus S |= A holds. Moreover, by induction hypothesis, for every subsequent set S of V we have S |= C holds and this implies, by definition of |=, S |= B → C holds. Summarizing, we have proved for the case T(B → C) ∈ S that for every subsequent set S of S, S |= A ∧ B holds. The case for T A ∈ S is similar: (i) T A ∈ S holds. We immediately get S |= A; (ii) T A ∈ S holds. By construction, in the stack of the nested recursive calls there are two sets U and V, previous of S , such that T(B → C) ∈ U and TC ∈ V or FB, T A ∈ V. For every set S in the stack of the nested recursive calls occurring between S and U, T A ∈ S holds, thus S |= A holds. Moreover, if TC ∈ V holds, then by induction hypothesis we get the assertion; if FB, T A ∈ V holds, to get the assertion we proceed as for the case T A ∈ S given above.
We emphasize that to guarantee the persistence of a formula A w.r.t. |=, it is necessary the occurrence of T A in a set S. From the proof of the lemma is clear that the condition TA ∈ S is relevant for atomic formulas and formulas containing implications, whereas the persistence of a formula A only containing occurrences of conjunctions and disjunctions does not require that T A occurs in the construction. As a simple example, consider the call G(S) where T p ∈ S and T( p ∨ q) ∈ S. By definition of |= we have S |= p ∨ q holds, and for every subsequent set S of S, we have S |= p ∨ q. On the other hand, let us suppose that Tq, Tr, T(q → r) ∈ S. By definition of |= we have S |= q → r. If in a subsequent set S the formula Tq occurs and Tr, T(q → r) ∈ S , then S |= q → r.
In the following lemma we provide correctness and completeness of G.
Theorem 6
Let S be a set of formulas. We have that:
1. if G(S) returns NULL, then there exists a Kripke model K = P,≤,ρ, such ρ S; 2. if G(S) returns a proof, then for every Kripke model K = P,≤,ρ, and for every α ∈ P, α S.
Proof We proceed by induction on the number of nested recursive calls.
Basis There are no recursive calls.
If G(S) returns NULL, then
Step 7 has been performed. We notice that S is consistent (otherwise Step 1 would have been performed). Let K = P,≤,ρ, be the model defined as follows: ρ = S, P = {ρ}, ρ ≤ ρ and ρ p iff T p ∈ S. Note that to simplify the notation in the following proof, we have defined ρ = S. There two main cases:
(i) S only contains atomic formulas signed with T or F. It is easy to prove that ρ S holds; (ii) S contains atomic formulas and formulas signed T( A → B), such that S |= A. It is immediate to show that ρ realizes the atomic formulas in S. To prove that for every T( A → B) ∈ S, ρ A → B holds, it is sufficient to prove that ρ A holds. We are going to show that ρ A is a consequence of the fact that by hypothesis S |= A. To this aim we prove the following Claim Let us suppose that Function G(S) executes Step 7. Then, for every formula X the following holds: ρ X iff ρ |= X.
Proof We proceed by induction on X.
Basis X is a propositional variable. If ρ |= X, then, by definition of |=, we have TX ∈ ρ and, by definition of forcing in ρ, we get ρ X. If ρ |= X, then, by the fact that ρ is a consistent set FX, TX ∈ ρ does not hold. By definition of |=, we have TX ∈ ρ and, by definition of forcing in ρ, we get ρ X.
Step
, by definition of |= and by the fact that the last step of G is performed, there are two cases:
(i) T(B → C) ∈ ρ holds. In this case by the fact that we are in the last step of G it follows that ρ |= B holds. By induction hypothesis ρ B holds and by definition of implication ρ B → C holds; (ii) ρ |= B or ρ |= C holds. By induction hypothesis we get ρ B or ρ C holds and in both cases we conclude ρ B → C holds. If ρ |= B → C, we exclude that F(B → C) ∈ ρ holds because by hypothesis last step of G is executed. Thus the only possible case is ρ |= B and ρ |= C. By applying the induction hypothesis we get ρ B → C;
, by definition of |= and by the fact that we are executing the last step of G, the only possibility is ρ |= B and ρ |= C hold. By induction hypothesis, ρ B and ρ C hold. This implies ρ B ∧ C holds. If ρ |= B ∧ C, then, since last step of G is performed, we exclude that FX ∈ S holds. Thus ρ |= B or ρ |= C holds. By induction hypothesis, ρ B or ρ C holds, thus ρ B ∧ C holds.
Case X = B ∨ C If ρ |= B ∨ C, then, by definition of |= and by the fact that we are executing the last step of G, the only possibility is ρ |= B or |= C holds. By induction hypothesis, ρ B or ρ C holds. This implies ρ B ∨ C holds. If ρ |= B ∨ C, then by the fact that we are executing last step of G, the only possibility is ρ |= B and ρ |= C. By induction hypothesis, ρ B and ρ C hold, thus ρ B ∨ C holds.
Here ends the proof of the claim.
Since for every T( A → B) ∈ ρ, we have ρ |= A holds, by the claim we deduce that ρ A holds and, by definition of implication, ρ A → B holds. Thus we have proved that the root of K realizes S.
If G(S) returns a proof, then
Step 1 is performed, thus S is inconsistent and an inconsistent set is not realizable.
Step By induction hypothesis we assume that the proposition holds for all sets S such that G(S ) requires less than n recursive calls. To prove the proposition holds for a set S such that G(S) requires n recursive calls, one has to inspect all the possible steps of G.
Let us suppose that
Step 5 is performed Thus we have that in S there exists a formula
We have to show that the rule application is correct. To this aim, we claim that if there exist a Kripke model K = P,≤,ρ, and a world α ∈ P such that α S, in the stack of the recursive calls there exists a set S 1 such that S X ∈ S 1 , with S ∈ {T, F}, and the side condition S |= X holds, then α X holds. By construction of function G, in the stack of the nested recursive calls there exists a set S 1 such that FX ∈ S 1 holds. Thus the conditions of the claim are fulfilled and we get that α X holds. By the hypothesis α X → Y and the definition of implication, we get α Y and α TY hold, and this means that rule T is correct. Now we have to proceed to prove the claim.
Claim Let K = P,≤,ρ, a model and α ∈ P an element such that α S. If S |= X and in the stack of recursive calls there exists a set S 1 such that S X ∈ S 1 , with S ∈ {T, F}, then α TX.
Proof
We proceed by induction on X.
Basis X is an atomic formula. By S |= X and the definition of |= we have that TX ∈ S. Since by hypothesis α S holds, we get the assertion.
∈ S, then the assertion immediately follows by hypothesis α S; if the hypothesis S |= K → H is fulfilled by the condition S |= K or S |= H holds, then we have two main cases: (i) in the stack of the recursive calls there exists a set S such that F(K → H) ∈ S . By definition of |=, F(K → H) ∈ S holds, thus, by construction, there exists a subsequent set S of S such that TK, FH ∈ S . By the persistence of |= proved in Lemma 2, S |= K. Then S |= K → H is fulfilled by condition S |= H holds. Since S |= H and FH ∈ S hold, by induction hypothesis applied to H we get α TH and, by definition of implication, α T(K → H);
(ii) in the stack of the recursive calls there exists a set S such that T(K → H) ∈ S . Since we are assuming that T(K → H) ∈ S and T(K → H) ∈ S hold and by the construction of function G, it follows that there exists a set S , subsequent of S , such that TH ∈ S . By Lemma 2 we have S |= H. We can apply the induction hypothesis to H and we get α H, α K → H and α T(K → H).
then the assertion immediately follows; if the hypothesis S |= K ∧ H is fulfilled by condition S |= K and S |= H hold, then we have two main cases: (i) in the stack of the recursive calls there exists a set S such that T(K ∧ H) ∈ S . Since we are assuming T(K ∧ H) ∈ S, by construction of function G, there exists a subsequent set S of S such that TK, TH ∈ S . Since both K and H fulfill the hypothesis of the claim, by induction hypothesis we get α TK and α TH hold and thus α T(K ∧ H) holds. (ii) in the stack of the recursive calls there exists a set S such that F(K ∧ H) ∈ S . Since S |= K ∧ H, by definition of |= we have that F(K ∧ H) ∈ S, thus by construction of G there exists a subsequent set S of S such that FK, FH ∈ S or FK, TH ∈ S or TK, FH ∈ S . Since we are assuming S |= K and S |= H, we can apply the induction hypothesis to K and H and we get that α K, α H and thus α T(K ∧ H).
then the assertion immediately follows; if the hypothesis S |= K ∨ H is fulfilled by condition S |= K or S |= H holds, then we have two main cases: (i) in the stack of the recursive calls there exists a set S 1 such that T(K ∨ H) ∈ S 1 . Since we are assuming T(K ∨ H) ∈ S, then, by construction of function G, there exists a subsequent set S 2 of S 1 such that TK ∈ S 2 or TH ∈ S 2 holds. By Lemma 2 we have that S |= K or S |= H holds. Thus at least one of the formulas fulfills the hypothesis of the claim and by induction hypothesis we get α K or α H holds, thus α T(K ∨ H) holds.
(ii) in the stack of the recursive calls there exists a set S 1 such that F(K ∨ H) ∈ S 1 . Since S |= K ∨ H holds, by definition of |= we have that F(K ∨ H) ∈ S holds, thus by construction of G there exists a subsequent set S 2 of S 1 such that FK, FH ∈ S 2 holds. Since we are assuming S |= K or S |= H holds, we can apply the induction hypothesis to K or H and we get the assertion.
The analysis related to the execution of Step 5 is concluded.
Let us suppose that
Step 6 is performed Note that in this case S contains atomic formulas, formulas of the kind T( A → B), with S |= A, and formulas of the kind F( A → B).
1. By induction hypothesis there exists a Kripke model K = P , ≤ , ρ , such that ρ realizes one of the sets in the conclusion of rule F →. We build the following structure K = P, ≤, ρ, such that
where we set ρ = S. By induction hypothesis K is a Kripke model for Dummett logic, hence: by the induction hypothesis that P , ≤ is a linear order and by definition of K, it follows that P, ≤ is a linear order with minimum ρ; by the induction hypothesis that ρ S c holds and by definition of , it follows that for every propositional variable p, if ρ p, then ρ p, thus the persistence of forcing is preserved. Thus we have proved that K is a Kripke model for Dummett logic. The difficult part in proving ρ S is to show that if T( A → B) ∈ S, then ρ T( A → B) that is ρ A → B. Since by induction hypothesis ρ A → B, it is sufficient to prove that ρ A. To this aim we exploit the definition of function G: when Step 6 is executed, the set S is consistent and if T( A → B) ∈ S holds, then S |= A holds. By definition of |= follows that T A ∈ S and T A ∈ S hold. As for the claim given to prove completeness of function G when Step 7 is performed, we are showing that ρ A is a consequence of the fact that by hypothesis S |= A. In the proof of next claim we have to take into account that also formulas of the kind F( A → B) can occur in S. In the notation of the proof we explicitly use the fact that the construction defines the elements of K as sets of formulas, namely the sets in Steps 6 and 7, and that in definition of K given above, we set ρ = S. Claim Let us suppose that Function G(S) executes Step 6. Then, for every formula X, ρ X iff ρ |= X.
Basis X is a propositional variable. If ρ |= X, then, by definition of |=, we have TX ∈ ρ and, by definition of forcing in ρ, we get ρ X. If ρ |= X, then, since S is consistent and by definition of |=, we have TX ∈ ρ and, by definition of forcing in ρ, we get ρ X.
Step 2. This is an easy task, because it is based on the fact that rule F → preserves the realizability. Let K = P,≤,ρ, be a model such that ρ S and let V = {F( A → B) ∈ S} and |V| = u. Then for every i = 1, . . . , u, there exists a world β i ∈ P such that α ≤ β, β T A i and β FB i . Let β j = min β 1 , . . . , β u . We have that β j S c ∪ V. Moreover, β j T A j , FB j . This implies that β j realizes at least one of the sets in the conclusion of F →. By induction hypothesis, in Step 6, the recursive call to G using S c ∪ (V \ {F( A j → B j )}) ∪ {T A j , FB j } as actual parameter does not return a proof, thus also G(S) does not return a proof.
The cases related to the execution of G at Steps 2, 3 and 4 are immediate.
We note that following the construction of Theorem 6, it is straightforward how to modify function G to get a function returning a proof or a counter model.
Remark 4
The proof of correctness of rule T suggests that in the calculus L, rule T can be replaced by the following:
S, T( A → B) S, FA|S, TB T−new
Rule T-new is correct, thus the side condition S |= A is no longer necessary. To preserve the completeness, function G has to apply T-new when S |= A holds. To prove the completeness of G, it has to be proved that whenever T-new is applied, the leftmost consequence is not realizable, that is G(S ∪ {FA}) returns a proof. This means that if G(S ∪ {T( A → B)}) returns a model, then G(S ∪ {TB}) returns a model. The proof goes similarly to the proof of correctness for T given above, showing that if the premise of T-new is realizable and S |= A holds, then T A is realizable and this excludes the realizability of S ∪ {F A}. Our presentation of the calculus avoids function G to perform useless recursive calls on the leftmost consequence of T-new. The same remark applies to rule T of calculus I.
Remark 5 An alternative presentation of calculus L is without employing sign T to label formulas that are not used as premise main formula of rule T →. There are two possibilities of replacing rules T → 1 and T:
S, FA|S, TB
By using the rules above it is possible to build tableaux whose depth is infinite. Also note the non-determinism in the application of the rules. For the first variant, we have a non-deterministic choice whenever S |= A holds. For the second variant, the non-deterministic choice is always possible. As a result, in order to be terminating and deterministic, a proof-search procedure based on one the variants of L given above has to implement a strategy that resembles the role of sign T. Summarizing, the presentation of L codifies in the syntax of the calculus how to handle formulas of the kind T( A → B) and getting finite tableaux.
Remark 6
Calculus L has a translation into a sequent calculus along the following lines:
-The structure of the sequents is ; ⇒ where , and are sets of formulas and contains T-formulas, the Tformulas and the F-formulas; -the conditions T⊥ ∈ S, {T A, FA} ⊆ S and {T A, FA} ⊆ S that make a set S inconsistent, become axiom rules:
; , ⊥ ⇒ ; , A ⇒ , A , A; ⇒ , A -to translate the rules from L to the sequent calculus it is sufficient to write them upside-down, putting the F-formulas one the right-hand side of the sequent and T and T-formulas in the left-hand side respecting the compartments. As an example we translate rules T → and T:
; Following Remark 5 a sequent calculus without compartments can be given. As already remarked for sign T, the compartment for , that corresponds to sign T, aims to bring in the logical apparatus the strategy to always get finite depth tableaux.
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented the tableau calculi Q and L for propositional Dummett logic obeying the subformula property and whose deductions have respectively quadratic and linear depth in the size of the formula to be decided. In the introduction we have argumented that the known calculi fail to meet all these features. Calculi presented in [1, 3, [10] [11] [12] [13] 17] fail to fulfill the subformula property, which is one of the properties characterizing our calculi; calculi provided in [4, 18] are based on hypersequents or labelled sequents (systems that are more expressive and cumbersome of tableau/sequents) whose deductions on the full language have exponential depth. As regards calculus Q, its object language contains signs to characterize the semantical status of "forced/non-forced in the next possible world" or "this is last possible world where the formula is not known", which are also employed in [13] . The depth of every deduction is bounded by the square of the size of the formula to be decided.
The semantics of the formulas handled by calculus L is restricted to the cases of forcing or non-forcing. To present L as a calculus whose deductions are always linearly bounded w.r.t. the size of the formula to be decided, the sign T is used together the usual signs T and F. Sign T explicitly brings into the logical apparatus the strategy to appropriately handle formulas of the kind T( A → B) to avoid infinite tableaux. A decision procedure can implement the strategy to a proof based on T and F. We have remarked that two different presentations of L based on T and F are possible. Both of them give rise to calculi having infinite tableaux and explicit nondeterminism related to the choice of the rule to handle T →-formulas. A decision procedure can use one of these presentations as it would use L and provide proofs of linear depth based on formulas signed with T and F.
Finally, calculi Q, L and its variants do not require backtracking and are based on a multiple premise rule.
Our completeness theorems prove that calculi Q and L provide a procedure returning a counter model or a proof. In particular, a feature of Q is that from a failed proof of a formula A it is possible to extract a counter model for A whose depth is n + 1 at most, with n the number of propositional variables occurring in A. From a remark on the completeness of Q we get calculus L. Calculus L shows that the semantics of Dummett logic implies that deduction conveys syntactical information about implicative formulas that can be used to drive the deduction by means of a fast computational check on some formulas which will not be used as premise main formula.
The multiple premise rules such as F n T and F →, which are analogous to the multiple premise rule used in [1, 7] , have been criticized because they have an arbitrary number of premises and thus they are supposed not to be suitable for automated deduction. In papers [12, 13] we showed that implementations of systems equipped with a rule analogous to F n T and F → are far better than the implementation based on decomposition systems of [3, 17] , which reduce the formulas to implicative atomic formulas and then applies transitivity rules or procedures based on graph reachability.
We note that it is possible to add some rules to optimize the proof search. As an example, by refining the completeness theorem for L, it follows that given T( A → B), if A does not contain implications, then we can turn T( A → B) into T( A → B), thus saving an application of T → still preserving the completeness. We believe that there are more general cases on the syntax on A that allow to avoid an useless application of rule T →. Moreover, since the sign of the occurrence of A in T( A → B) is F, it could be possible to apply our check to F-formulas in order to avoid also useless applications of F-rules.
Propositional Dummett logic can be decided by a nondeterministic Turing machine working in polynomial time w.r.t. the formula to be decided by an easy guessand-check procedure: guess the forcing on a Kripke model K with n + 1 worlds of the n variables of the formula A to be decided and check if the root of K forces A. Thus the problem of deciding if a formula belongs to propositional Dummett logic is in co-NP. From the computational analysis performed in Sections 3.3 and 4.3 it follows that also functions D and G can be implemented on a nondeterministic Turing machine working in polynomial time w.r.t. the formula to be proved.
As a future work, the first question is to study if it is possible to apply the same technique to the first-order case of Dummett logic. Currently we are investigating how to adapt the techniques employed for L to propositional intuitionistic logic, whose Kripke semantics is more complicated than Dummett logic. Our preliminary results show that, because the Kripke semantics of propositional intuitionistic logic is based on trees, to get the correctness, the relation |= is too strong. Moreover, such a new relation has to be used to drive the application of the non-invertible rules for formulas of the kind T ( A → B) and F( A → B) . The strategy that we get is more involved than that given for L because we have to handle the noninvertible rules for T → and F∨ formulas and, differently from Dummett logic, in intuitionistic propositional logic non-determinism in the application of the rules is (provided PSPACE =NP) unavoidable.
